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Religiosity and Voting for the Radical Right

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Religiosity and Voting for the Radical Right*

Religiosity has traditionally been a strong predictor of electoral choice. Furthermore, it has now assumed a greater centrality in the politics of West European societies, not least because of increasingly tense relations between Christian or agnostic majorities and minorities of other faiths. By drawing on theories of electoral choice and on socio-psychological literature largely ignored by scholars of electoral behaviour, this paper models the impact of Christian religiosity on support for radical right parties whose core issue is immigration from non-Western countries. Our findings demonstrate that while religiosity has few direct effects, and while religious people are neither more nor less hostile towards ethnic minorities and thereby neither more nor less prone to vote for a radical right party, they are not 'available' to these parties since they are still firmly attached to Christian Democratic or conservative parties. However, given increasingly de-alignment, this 'vaccine effect' is likely to become weaker with time.

Keywords: religiosity; radical right voting; ethnocentrism; party identification.

*An updated version of this paper will appear in *West European Politics* in due course.

Religiosity and Voting for the Radical Right

Forty years ago, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) published their seminal work in which they described how different social cleavages helped shape ideological and partisan divisions. Among the four cleavages they identified was the State-Church cleavage, formed as a product of the '*National Revolution*', which saw 'conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing *Nation-State* and the historically established corporate privileges of the *Church*' (1967, p.14, italics in original). This conflict, and the cleavage it created, brought about the emergence of parties that were allied to the church and that sought to defend religious interests. With the advent of universal (manhood) suffrage, the conflict became further institutionalized, most notably by the formation and rise of Christian or Christian Democratic parties.

In the years before and after Lipset and Rokkan's study, it had become widely accepted that religious affiliation and church attendance were important predictors of electoral choice. In early empirical work on mass electoral behaviour, Rose and Urwin, for example, concluded that 'religious divisions, not class, are the main social bases of parties in the Western world today' (1969, p. 12). Similarly, in his examination of four countries, Lijphart (1979) reported religious denomination and church attendance to have the strongest influence on people's electoral choice.

By the 1980s, however, studies began to document the decline of traditional cleavages, and to point to the weakening of party attachments (e.g. Crewe, 1983; Crewe and Särlvik, 1983; Dalton et al., 1984; Crewe and Denver, 1985). As concerns the religious cleavage, levels of church membership and religious participation have fallen, and fewer people accept the main theological claims of Christianity than they once did (Girvin, 2000, p. 12). Thus, as the number of individuals for whom religious cues are relevant is decreasing, so the partisan significance of religious cues is weakening (Dalton, 1996, pp. 326-328).

Despite these developments, however, it is still widely acknowledged that traditional social cleavages continue to be important in structuring partisan alignments and electoral choice (Mair et al., 2004, p. 1). It remains the case that voting differences in religious denominations persist in some countries in Western Europe. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the divide between religious voters and secular voters is still a relatively strong predictor of vote (Dalton, 1996, pp. 327-328). With regard to the influence of the level of church attendance on electoral choice, Girvin argues that 'although electoral behaviour is affected by other factors such as gender and class, church attendance in a number of cases is the single most important variable in explaining voting decisions' (2000, p. 13). He goes on to note that while widespread social changes 'do imply that Christian Democratic or Conservative parties can no longer depend on an integrated religious and traditional political base to launch their political appeals [...] these changes do not undermine the traditional finding that those who attend church regularly are more inclined to support a party on the right than one on the left' (2000, p. 21). Similarly, Norris and Inglehart find that 'in industrial and postindustrial societies [...] religious participation remains a significant positive predictor of Right orientations', even after controlling for other socio-demographic factors. They conclude that 'religious participation emerges as the single strongest predictor of Right ideology in the model, showing far more impact than any of the indicators of social class' (2004, pp. 204-207).

In addition to its continued importance as a traditional predictor of electoral choice, religion has also rather unexpectedly assumed greater centrality in the political life of West European societies in recent years. Indeed, religion has experienced a significant return to the global political agenda in the last decade or so, as evidenced by the rise of Hindu nationalism in India, the de-secularization of the Middle East conflicts, and, of course, by the war between Al Qaeda and ‘the West’. In turn, some of these developments have had considerable domestic implications in many West European societies because they have begun to aggravate tensions between Christian or agnostic majorities and a whole host of minority groups that are increasingly defined – by themselves as well as by the outside world – not in ethnic, but in religious terms. Conflicts about the symbolism of headscarves worn in public institutions in France, the row about veils in the UK, death-threats aimed at female politicians from Islamic backgrounds in the Netherlands and in Germany, and the crisis over the Danish cartoons provide ample evidence for this.

In this context then, it becomes interesting and apt to revisit the link between religion and electoral choice. From our more specific perspective, it also seems important to focus on the link between religion on the one hand, and the vote for parties that present themselves as the ultimate defenders of European national cultures, values and identities on the other – that is, parties of the radical right.

Theoretical framework: religiosity and voting for the radical right

If religious affiliation and religious involvement (in their various guises) remain reasonably strong predictors of electoral choice, it not only makes sense to examine the extent to which they might account for the likelihood of a vote in favour of a party that has traditionally defended religious interests (i.e. a Christian, Christian Democratic or conservative party), but it also is reasonable to investigate the degree to which they reduce the likelihood of a vote for another type of party. In this paper we focus our attention on the extent to which religious affiliation and involvement influence the likelihood of an individual casting a ballot for a party of the radical right. In other words, the question with which we concern ourselves here is *the extent to which religiosity influences the likelihood of a vote for a party of the radical right*. As discussed below in greater detail, we conceptualize religiosity as a combination of religious affiliation, church attendance, private religious practice and self-stated religiosity. Precisely because our conceptualization captures the different aspects of religious activity and beliefs, we favour the term ‘religiosity’ over ‘religiousness’ or simply ‘religion’.

The question is significant for a number of different reasons, some of which suggest good cause to expect religiosity to reduce the likelihood of a vote for a party of the radical right, and others that lead to the contrary expectation, namely that religiosity might increase the likelihood of a vote for the radical right. On the one hand, as we have seen, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that religious affiliation and involvement will lead to a greater likelihood of a voter voting for a party of the mainstream right, such as a Christian, Christian Democratic or conservative party that has traditionally defended religious interests, than any other type of party, including a party of the radical right (see Hypothesis H1 below).¹ In other words, it is

¹ Of course Christian and Christian Democratic parties differ from conservative parties in terms of their origins and ideologies, with the former traditionally defending Christian values and the latter having no links with organized religion. That said, existing research has shown that religious voters have tended to favour parties of the mainstream right, irrespective of whether these parties are of the Christian Democratic or the conservative type (Girvin, 2000; Norris and Inglehart, 2004).

reasonable to expect a certain degree of ‘encapsulation’ of religious voters by Christian, Christian Democratic or conservative parties.

Along with this ‘encapsulation’, we also expect religious voters to be somewhat less likely to vote for a party of the radical right because both traditionally, and even in the contemporary period, radical right parties have never really attempted to appeal to religious voters on the basis of broadly religious issues. Religion does not feature prominently in the ideologies and programmatic statements of the contemporary parties of the Western European radical right.² Instead, these parties only address the subject of religion for purposes of political advantage and mobilization and/or because it fits in with their particular world-view. For example, they are much more concerned about those non-Western religions (particularly Islam) that are said to be a threat to Western culture and society, than they are about any of the moral substance of religious teachings, or about what adhering to a faith might actually mean and entail.³ Moreover, in some countries like Austria and Germany, the radical right has anti-clerical traditions. Somewhat similarly, the Progress Parties of Norway and Denmark have libertarian roots, which make them less likely to appeal to religious voters.

Related to this last point on ideology and programmatic statements, we would also expect religious voters to be less likely to support a party of the radical right since the beliefs and appeals of these parties often contrast sharply with the beliefs and values of these voters (see Hypothesis H2a below). After all, the values, beliefs, and traditions associated with most contemporary versions of the Christian faith are those of tolerance, compassion and altruism, and one would expect these to find little in common with the authoritarian, xenophobic and even racist ideologies and appeals of the parties of the radical right, and the practice of targeting some of the most vulnerable groups in society such as refugees and immigrants. For a number of different reasons, therefore, it is wholly reasonable to suggest that religiosity might ‘insulate’ voters from the appeals of a party of the radical right.

However, for a variety of other reasons, it also makes sense to hypothesize the contrary, and to expect religious affiliation, religious involvement and the intensity of religious beliefs to be linked with a greater support for a party of the radical right. As regards religious affiliation, a number of studies, starting with that by Allport and Kramer (1946), have concluded that people with no religious affiliation show lower levels of ethnocentrism than people who describe themselves as Catholic or Protestant (see also Pettigrew, 1959). As for religious involvement, dozens of analyses have pointed to the existence of a relationship between church attendance and levels of prejudice. The seminal work by Adorno et al. (1950) was one

² To give a few examples, a 515 word-long chapter in the Austrian Freedom Party’s main platform is concerned with Christianity as the root of European culture. This is less than five per cent of the text. Moreover, about one third of this chapter argues that current separation of church and state must be retained. (See www.fpoe.at/index.php?id=459 retrieved 01/05/2007). Similarly, the Danish People’s Party – a party that has shown a rather high level of concern about religious issues in the past – devotes three sentences (88 words) of its 1,000 word basic manifesto to Christianity and the role of the state church of Denmark (Folkekirken). (See www.dansksfolkeparti.dk/sw/ffrontend/show.asp?parent=19185&menu_parent=22669&layout=0 retrieved 01/05/2007). Finally, an official 1,600-word statement on ‘The Principles of the Norwegian Progress Party’ contains only one reference to the ‘Christian Ethos’ as something positive. (See http://english.frp.no/Innhold/FrP/Temasider/Flere_sprak/English/The_Principles/ retrieved 01/05/2007).

³ See for instance the ‘Vienna Declaration’ that pits ‘inalienable Christian values’ (without saying what these values are and what they imply) against ‘aggressive Islamism’. (See www.ots.at/presseaussendung.php?schluessel=OTS_20051114_OT0051&ch=politik retrieved 21/11/2005). This declaration was issued by the Austrian Freedom Party, the French National Front, the Flemish Vlaams Belang and several minor parties in November 2005 and is supposed to be the founding document of a future ‘Nationalist International’.

of the first to report a curvilinear relationship between church attendance and prejudice. While, in general, it found higher levels of ethnocentrism among churchgoers than among non-attenders, more specifically it found that regular churchgoers and non-attenders were both less prejudiced than those who attended church on a less frequent or an irregular basis.⁴

A number of other studies proposed that prejudice did not simply depend on religious affiliation and on the regularity with which an individual went to church but instead rested on the nature of particular religious convictions or of belief structures. These works suggest that people with strong religious beliefs are prone to developing a 'closed belief-system', which has often been linked to ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. Rokeach (1960), for example, observed higher levels of dogmatism, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism among believers than non-believers and attributed this to 'closed mindedness' (a tendency to reject information that contradicts one's own world views), while Glock and Stark (1966) concluded that orthodox Christian beliefs were positively linked with anti-Semitism, and argued that this was so because an orthodox belief structure generates a particularistic religious orientation that sees other orientations as incompatible (but see also the criticisms of Glock and Stark's model by Middleton, 1973; Ploch, 1974; Roof, 1974; Hoge and Carroll, 1975).

It should be borne in mind that many of the early studies on religiosity and prejudice have been criticized on theoretical, conceptual and methodological grounds (see Eisinga et al., 1999 for a useful summary). In the first instance, many of these studies have failed to ascertain whether religious doctrines act as a trigger for prejudice, or whether, conversely, they legitimate existing prejudices. Secondly, on a conceptual level, criticisms have been levelled at the early studies for failing to adequately specify both dependent and independent variables, and in particular for muddling up different dimensions or aspects of religiosity, such as affiliation, church attendance, and belief structures (Scheepers et al., 2002, pp. 244-246). Finally, as regards methodology, early works tended to examine bivariate relationships only, and did not control for other social variables such as age, educational level, class, or localism.

The shortcomings of these various studies notwithstanding, there is still good reason to hypothesize that religiosity may be linked with a greater propensity to vote for a party of the radical right because the literature cited above points to a link between religiosity and ethnocentrism. Since ethnocentrist attitudes are one of the most powerful predictors of a vote for a party of the radical right (Billiet and De Witte, 1995, p. 193; van der Brug et al., 2000, pp. 90-91; Lubbers et al., 2002), it makes sense to hypothesize a two-step link between religiosity, ethnocentrism and voting for a party of the radical right, with religious people showing a greater likelihood to vote for the radical right than other people (see Hypothesis H2b below).

The need to control for other social factors is particularly important to the hypothesis that religiosity is expected to be linked with a greater propensity to vote for a party of the radical right. Indeed, it could well be that religiosity is not a cause of radical right thinking, but is instead a correlate, since religious people are not only older (Argue et al., 1999), but also tend to have lower levels of education (see Johnson, 1997) and therefore are less likely to embrace liberal-democratic values than their compatriots (see Hypothesis H3 below).⁵

⁴ For confirmation of this curvilinear relationship see also Holtzman, 1956; Pettigrew, 1959; Allport and Ross, 1967; Gorsuch and Aleshire, 1974; Studlar, 1978; Petersen and Takayama, 1984; Eisinga et al., 1990.

⁵ Many studies have also found that more women than men tend to be religious (Walter and Davie, 1998; Miller and Stark, 2002). That said, women have been shown to be less likely to vote for a radical right party than men

Four hypotheses are suggested by this review. H1, and H2a and H2b are based on the different bodies of literature reviewed above and on the different reasonings to emerge from these. These hypotheses thus bring together different stands of theory that have not been considered in combination before. By contrast, H3 proposes that religiosity has no direct effect on the likelihood of a radical right vote, and instead any effect is due to socio-demographic characteristics alone.

H1: Religious people are less likely to vote for the radical right because they are firmly attached to Christian Democratic or conservative parties;

H2a: Religious people are less likely to vote for the radical right because they are *less* likely to adopt ethnocentric attitudes;

H2b: Religious people are more likely to vote for the radical right because they are *more* likely to adopt ethnocentric attitudes;

H3: All *direct* relationships between religiosity and the vote are spurious, i.e. once radical right-wing attitudes and party identification are controlled for, the remaining effects of religiosity are due to the socio-demographic profile of religious people and will disappear completely if group memberships are taken into consideration.

In principle, these mechanisms can either reinforce or counterbalance each other. In addition, the extent to which these hypotheses may or may not be borne out in practice will clearly depend on differences in national contexts and on features of each political system. It is well beyond the scope of this study to examine these differing national contexts (and a number of volumes engage in this task rather well – see for example Hanley, 1994; Broughton and ten Napel, 2000; van Hecke and Gerard, 2004), but as a starting point we may point to the importance of differences in the strength of the religious cleavage. In the Lutheran countries of Scandinavia the religious cleavage is relatively weak (Madeley, 2004), and so encapsulation by Christian Democratic parties is likely to be moderate at best. By contrast, in denominationally mixed countries, where this cleavage is stronger, greater encapsulation is to be expected. Secondly, any traditional links between the church and specific political forces are likely to influence the extent to which the hypotheses presented above are supported. In France, for instance, there has historically been a close connection between fundamentalist streams within the Catholic Church and anti-modern and illiberal political forces (Veugelers, 2000, p. 30; Minkenberg, 2003). In this context, religiosity is likely to have a quite different connotation than it might have in countries that lack such a tradition.

The characteristics of individual Christian Democratic and conservative parties, as well as those of the individual radical right parties will also have an effect on our findings. Most obvious of course is whether the parties of the mainstream right are Christian Democratic or conservative parties. The French mainstream right is a conservative one since a distinctive Christian party disappeared with the advent of the Fifth Republic and the last Christian Democratic political force ceased to exist in 1995 (Massart, 2004). In our other countries, however, the mainstream right is made up of Christian Democratic parties, or parties with a Christian Democratic heritage. Even here though, significant differences exist between the

(Betz, 1994; Lubbers et al., 2002). One of the key benefits of our analysis is that we can disentangle these effects and are thereby able to resolve such apparent contradictions.

parties. On a general level, while some Christian Democratic parties, such as the Austrian ÖVP, are catch-all parties that have attempted to integrate a whole host of different ideological tendencies (Fallend, 2004), others, like the Belgian CVP and PSC remain confessional parties (Lucardie and ten Napel, 1994). Different still are the Scandinavian Christian Democratic parties, which emerged much later and which grew ‘out of traditions of religious dissent representing various shades of dissatisfaction with the religious establishment among activist minorities’ (Madeley, 2004, p. 218). On a more specific, policy-level, some Christian Democratic parties have tended to stress the Christian values of compassion and tolerance and are therefore inclined to support the rights of immigrants (see for instance della Porta, 2002 on the case of Italy, where a strong, Catholic pro-immigrant movement exists). By contrast, other such parties take a tough stand on immigration. For example, the German Christian Social Union takes a particularly restrictive stance on immigration (Lubbers et al., 2002, p. 356).

As for the radical right parties, differences in ideological profile are also likely to have implications for our findings. This party family has been shown by a number of authors to be particularly heterogeneous (e.g. Ignazi, 1992; Betz, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Taggart, 1995; Mudde, 1996; Carter, 2005), and differences in the parties’ appeals will attract different socio-economic segments of the electorate, and will entice voters with different attitudes. While most parties of the radical right have no specific interest in religion, the French Front National has always (not least through its stand on abortion) tried to appeal to conservative Catholics, and the Italian Alleanza Nazionale is actively trying to develop a more Christian/conservative profile. The latter party is also unusual insofar as it places much less emphasis on the issue of immigration and is (partly for historical reasons) much less xenophobic than most other parties of the radical right (della Porta, 2002).

For all these reasons, therefore, we certainly expect country differences. That said, it is not our intention here (especially with only eight cases) to test explanations for these differences, even though we can engage in some speculation as regards our results.

In addition to the different reasons sketched out above that suggest why it is pertinent to examine the extent to which religiosity influences the likelihood of a vote for a party of the radical right, we are also guided by the fact that there is a major gap in the academic literature on this subject – both in the literature on religion and in the literature on radical right voting. While dozens of studies of radical right voting behaviour have examined the impact of socio-structural variables (see Arzheimer and Carter, 2006 for a review), very few have investigated the influence of religiosity. Rather most only focus on gender, age, education and class. Furthermore, of the handful that have investigated the influence of religiosity on the radical right party vote, the majority are single-country studies.⁶

There are just three cross-national studies of radical right voting that have included an examination of the effect of religiosity. Van der Brug et al., (2000) consider the effect of religiosity on the preference for anti-immigrant parties by including a composite variable in their model, made up of religious denomination and church attendance. They find that this variable has weak and inconsistent effects on party preference. The study by van der Brug and Fennema (2003) repeats the analysis and draws essentially the same conclusions. In a somewhat similar fashion, Lubbers et al. examine the effect of religiosity on right-wing

⁶ See Mayer and Perrineau, 1992 on the French Front National; Westle and Niedermayer, 1992 on the German Republikaner; Billiet, 1995 and Billiet and De Witte, 1995 on the Vlaams Blok; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000 on the German Republikaner; van der Brug, 2003 on the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn.

extremist voting by distinguishing between non-religious people, religious people belonging to non-Christian denominations, and Christian people. They conclude that non-religious people are over-represented in the extreme right electorate (2002, p. 364), a finding that has been reported before in single-country studies (e.g. Mayer, 1998 for the changing composition of the Front National's electorate).

Compared to some of the national studies (in particular Billiet, 1995), the existing comparative studies conceptualize religiosity in a rather simple way. Given that the research on religiosity and ethnocentrism mentioned above suggests that religious affiliation, involvement and belief structures can be linked to the radical right vote in different ways, this is a disadvantage, not least since the total effect of religiosity is likely to be underestimated under these circumstances (Bartle, 1998). Indeed, if one is to untangle the effects of religiosity on the likelihood of a vote for a party of the radical right, it becomes important to conceptualize religiosity in a manner that captures its different aspects or dimensions. This is precisely what we attempt to do in this article. In addition, in contrast to the comparative studies just cited, in which religiosity is an independent variable, we specify a model of radical right voting that incorporates religiosity as a variable that appears *before* political attitudes in the causal chain. This enables us to consider the different ways in which religiosity may affect the likelihood of a radical right vote. In particular, it allows us to examine whether its effects are direct, indirect, or are due to background variables.

Modelling the links between background variables, religiosity and the radical right vote

Although our model is a little complicated, its basic structure (see Figure 1) is of the simple block-recursive type that has been fruitfully applied in electoral research before (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Bartle, 1998) and that helps us to establish the direction of the flow of causality. Located at the very beginning of the causal chain are several socio-demographic variables, which, for all practical purposes, can be treated as fixed and therefore exogenous. Though these socio-demographics will often affect the level of religiosity as well as the development of political attitudes and the vote, it is practically inconceivable that religiosity will cause gender, age, or class. Religiosity in turn can have a causal effect both on political attitudes and on behaviour. It is rather implausible to assume the reverse. Finally, the vote itself depends (amongst other things) on attitudes, religiosity and socio-demographic features but does itself not alter these variables.⁷

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The actual model on which our analysis is based is represented in Figure 2. The dependent variable in the analysis (Block IV of the overview) is vote for a party of the radical right, as depicted on the right hand side of the diagram (for details on the data for the variables, see below). This, we argue, is likely to be influenced by three sets of independent variables: religiosity (Block II); radical right attitudes (Block III); and socio-demographics (Block I). In addition, it is likely to be influenced by an intervening variable, namely an individual's party

⁷ We have chosen not to delve into the endless controversy about the stability and exogeneity/endogeneity of party identification.

identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party (labelled ‘CD-PID’). This is also located in Block III.⁸

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

In the first instance, we begin by considering the impact of the three sets of independent variables independently of each other. The variable ‘Religiosity’ is a latent variable constructed from four observable variables, labelled rel_1 , rel_2 , rel_3 , and rel_4 in Figure 2. These pertain to i) the regularity with which an individual engages in private religious practice or prayer; ii) the regularity with which an individual attends religious services; iii) whether an individual belongs to a Christian church; and iv) an individual’s self-stated religiosity. On the one hand, these variables tap the different aspects of religiosity that previous research has identified. On the other, since they are highly correlated in all countries under study, it is justified to treat them as indicators of a single latent variable.⁹ As alluded to above in Hypothesis 3, independent of any identification with conservative or Christian Democratic parties and independent of an individual’s radical right attitudes we expect to see *no* direct relationship between religiosity and the radical right vote (represented by the arrow that flows from ‘Religiosity’ to ‘Radical Right Vote’) because the parties of the radical right pay little attention to religious issues.

The variable ‘Radical Right Attitudes’ is also a latent variable, constructed from a whole host of observable attitudinal variables (labelled rra_1 , rra_2 etc in Figure 2). It is akin to ethnocentrism and xenophobia (see Table A2 in the appendix for details). Clearly, the relationship between this variable and the radical right vote is expected to be positive since many existing studies have shown that one of the greatest predictors of a radical right vote is an individual’s attitude towards immigrants (see e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002).

Our third set of independent variables is composed of socio-demographic variables. These include age, gender, class and education. In line with the findings of previous studies, we expect younger voters to exhibit a greater propensity to vote for the radical right than older voters; male voters to show a greater likelihood of voting for a party of the radical right than female voters; voters with lower levels of education to be more likely to cast a ballot for the radical right than voters with high levels of education; and working-class voters, farmers and individuals who are classified as forming the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ to have a greater likelihood of voting for the radical right (Betz, 1994; Lubbers et al., 2002; Givens, 2004; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006).

In addition to the three sets of independent variables, our model also includes an intervening variable that refers to voters’ identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party, which is labelled ‘CD-PID’ in Figure 2. We expect voters who identify with such parties to be

⁸ While in an ideal world we would have liked to include more political attitudes in our model such as people’s evaluation of candidates, their stances on particular policies, and their ideological distance from the parties, such indicators were not available in the dataset we used. This is not a significant problem, however, as stances on policies and ideological location are highly correlated with radical right attitudes anyway. As such, we do not believe that our model is underspecified.

⁹ Across all countries, the intercorrelations vary between 0.47 (praying and Christian self-identification) and 0.64 (praying and self-stated degree of religiosity).

less likely to vote for a party of the radical right than voters who display no identification with Christian Democratic or conservative parties – this is implicit in Hypothesis H1.

Of course, the three independent variables just discussed are not expected to exert an influence on the propensity of an individual voting for a party of the radical right in isolation only. Rather, socio-demographic variables are likely to have an impact on an individual's religiosity, and on his or her attitudes. This is shown in Figure 2 by arrows that flow from 'Socio-Demographics' to 'Religiosity', and from 'Socio-Demographics' to 'Radical Right Attitudes'. In addition, socio-demographics are likely to have an impact on the likelihood of an individual's identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party. Hence there is a further arrow running from 'Socio-Demographics' to 'CD-PID'. We also cannot rule out the possibility that the socio-demographics have a direct impact on the vote after controlling for religiosity, radical right attitudes, and 'CD-PID', and there is therefore an arrow connecting 'Socio-Demographics' and 'Radical Right Vote' directly, capturing any residual effects of group membership on the vote that might remain after controlling for attitudes. These include any spurious effects of religiosity (Hypothesis H3).

Religiosity, in turn, for the theoretical reasons discussed above is likely to have either a negative or a positive impact on radical right attitudes (Hypotheses H2a and H2b). This is shown by the arrow in Figure 2 that runs from 'Religiosity' to 'Radical Right Attitudes'. Furthermore, we expect that religiosity will have an effect on identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party.

Radical right attitudes are very likely to have a direct effect on the vote for the radical right. Yet we cannot rule out that they might additionally be correlated with 'CD-PID' because people who identify with established, mainstream right-wing parties (which tend to take a tougher stance on immigration than mainstream left-wing parties) may well be more likely to hold radical right attitudes than other citizens. That said, we can make no assumption as regards the direction of this relationship, and so our model depicts a mere correlation, as represented by a double-headed arrow running between 'Radical Right Attitudes' and 'CD-PID'.

This model enables us to test whether religiosity influences the radical right vote in any way whatsoever. *If* religiosity does affect the radical right vote, the model also allows us to test whether it does so directly, or indirectly (through radical right attitudes and/or an identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party), or whether the effect of religiosity is spurious (i.e. that it is related to socio-background variables). The model thus allows us to test a number of alternative 'routes' that have so far largely been neglected or conflated in the literature on religiosity and on the radical right. Finally, by applying this model to a number of polities, we can assess whether we can generalize about the effects of religiosity on the vote in Western Europe.

Data and Methodology

Our data come from the first round of the European Social Survey (EES). This database is particularly attractive because it i) covers (almost) all the countries we are interested in, ii) is fairly recent (the fieldwork was done in 2002-3), and iii) includes a whole host of measures of radical right attitudes as well as of religious views and behaviours. Moreover, the principal

investigators have taken great pains to ensure that the data are of a high quality and that the indicators are as comparable as possible.¹⁰

From the 22 countries that were covered in the first round of the ESS, eight West European systems that have witnessed a substantial and persistent support for the radical right were selected for our analyses: Austria; Belgium; Denmark; France; Italy; Netherlands; Norway; and Switzerland. While we concur with Golder (2003) that countries in which the radical right has been unsuccessful should be included in a macro-level explanation of party success so as to avoid selection bias, it makes no sense to include such countries in micro-level models. If not a single respondent reports the intention to vote for the radical right (as in Spain, Sweden, or the UK), then there is simply nothing to model. By much the same token we excluded Germany because here the number of self-declared radical right voters was tiny (n=10). Including a country with so few radical right respondents presents a number of problems, and makes conventional logit or probit modelling unfeasible (Zorn, 2005).

Within the eight countries, respondents under the age of 18, persons who were not citizens of the respective country, and members of non-Christian faiths (e.g. Buddhists, Jews, Muslims) were excluded. All respondents who stated that they would vote for the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei (FPÖ), the Flemish Vlaams Blok (VB) or the French-speaking Belgian Front National (FNb), the Danish Dansk Folkeparti (DF) or Fremskridtspartiet (FRPd), the French Front National (FN) or Mouvement National Républicain (MNR), the Italian Alleanza Nazionale (AN), Lega Nord (LN) or Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (Ms-Ft), the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FRPn), or the Swiss Freiheitspartei der Schweiz (FPS), Lega dei Ticinesi (LdT), Schweizer Demokraten (SD) or Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)¹¹ were coded as supporters of the radical right (1). All remaining respondents were given a code of zero. There were roughly 1,700 respondents per country.¹²

Coding the socio-demographic variables is relatively straightforward. For gender, male respondents were coded 1, and female respondents were coded 0. Age was recoded to three categories that reflect the findings of previous studies on its effects on the radical right vote (18-29; 30-65; older than 65). For social class, data was mapped onto the familiar Goldthorpe-Scheme.¹³ To keep things as simple as possible, we created a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for those classes that have shown the greatest support for the radical right in the past –

¹⁰ See the extensive reports on data quality and comparability which are downloadable from the ESS website: <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

¹¹ The SVP (which accounts for more than 90 per cent of the Swiss voters coded as ‘radical right’) is perhaps a borderline case for inclusion in the radical right party family. While its most prominent figure, billionaire Christoph Blocher, has successfully adopted the styles and issues of the radical right, a smaller and less influential wing sticks to the much more moderate conservative tradition of the party. That said, Blocher’s dominance of the party by the late 1990s has led observers to argue that the SVP has now evolved into a radical right party (McGann and Kitschelt, 2005).

¹² The exact numbers were 2,033 for Austria, 1,634 for Belgium, 1,388 for Denmark, 1,374 for France, 1,156 for Italy, 2,197 for the Netherlands, 1,889 for Norway, and 1,689 for Switzerland.

¹³ To do this, we relied on macros provided by Ganzeboom and Treiman that map information about a person’s job (coded according to ISCO-88 scheme in the ESS) into the Goldthorpe-Scheme. John Hendrickx has kindly converted the original SPSS macros for this procedure to a series of Ado-Files for Stata and has made these available to the public via the repository at Boston College. See <http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425801.html> for details. For France, the ISCO-88 variable is missing in the integrated data set (5.1) because the information collected in that country is insufficient for a *full* classification according to the ISCO-88. However, since the data are sufficient for a classification according to the Goldthorpe-Scheme in which we are ultimately interested, we replaced the missing values with appropriate information from the French country file.

workers, farmers, and the petty bourgeoisie – and 0 for all others. For education we used a seven-point scale of achievement constructed by the ESS team that allows the impact of education to be compared across Europe. This ranges from ‘no primary education’ (1) to ‘second stage of tertiary education’ (7).

As for religiosity, the ESS contains four measures that capture the different aspects of religious activity and beliefs. Two refer to behaviours: private religious practice (i.e. praying outside of religious services) and public religious practice (i.e. attending religious services other than on occasions like weddings, funerals etc.). These were each measured on a seven-point rating scale ranging from 1 (‘every day’) to 7 (‘never’). Both scales were reversed to facilitate interpretation. The two other indicators tap religious affiliation and beliefs. The first simply asks whether the respondent identifies with any particular religion or denomination. We coded this variable as 1 for those who consider themselves as belonging to any major or minor Christian church, including those who see themselves as Christians but do not belong to a denomination. All others (i.e. atheists and agnostics) were coded as 0. The last measure of religiosity asks for a self-assessment of the respondent’s religiosity on a rating scale that ranges from 0 (‘not at all religious’) to 10 (‘very religious’). Since the wording of the question makes it clear that this is not about formal membership, and since the adherents of non-Christian religions have been removed from the dataset, this can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of non-institutionalized Christian beliefs.

Identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party in the sense of the Ann-Arbor model¹⁴ was operationalized as a simply dummy variable. Those respondents who identified with the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) in Austria; the Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) (now Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, CD&V) or Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) (now Centre Démocrate Humaniste, CDH) in Belgium; the Konservative Folkeparti (KF) or Kristendemokraterne (KD) in Denmark; the Rassemblement pour la France (RPF), Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) or Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) in France; the Centro Cristiano Democratico-Cristiani Democratici Uniti (CCD-CDU) (now Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro, UDC), Forza Italia or Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano (NPSI) in Italy; the Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA), ChristenUnie (CU) or Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) in the Netherlands; the Kristelig Folkeparti (KRF) or Høyre (H) in Norway; and the Christlich Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz (CVP) or Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz (EVP) in Switzerland were coded as 1, while all others were coded as 0.¹⁵

Finally, the ESS contains an extraordinary broad selection of measures of radical right attitudes. We selected 21 of these, which cover five broad domains that are representative of contemporary radical rightist thinking: economic and social attitudes towards immigrants, concerns about cultural and security issues, the tendency to discriminate against immigrants, the tendency to treat members of the white race differently, and attitudes concerning refugees.

¹⁴ The question reads: ‘Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?’ An additional note clarifies the meaning: “‘feel closer to’ in the sense of the party one most identifies or sympathises with or is most attached to, regardless of how one votes.’ While this note is helpful in that it reflects the fact that identification and voting intention are not necessarily identical, it is nonetheless less than ideal because it does not adequately reflect (relative) stability, which is part of the concept.

¹⁵ In some countries the main right-wing competitor is a liberal party rather than a Christian Democratic or conservative one – e.g. the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) in the Netherlands. We have no interest in including such parties in our model, however, as we are concerned with examining the extent to which an identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party encapsulates religious voters, and in so doing, decreases their likelihood of voting for a party of the radical right (see Hypothesis H1).

These attitudes were measured on a variety of rating scales. Details are given in Table A2 of the appendix. To avoid an unnecessarily high degree of model complexity, all these (highly correlated) subdimensions are represented by a single latent variable.

Item non-response in the ESS is generally rather low. Yet, since we have a significant number of variables in our model, even a small percentage of missing values adds up. Hence, rather than use listwise deletion, which would reduce the sample size dramatically, we used Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE, see van Buuren and Oudshoorn, 1999), a very versatile imputation method that fills the gaps in the data set with ‘plausible’ values.¹⁶

Since our core dependent variable, one intervening variable and several of our indicator variables are dichotomous, we opted for an extension of the Structural Equation Modelling framework that allows for transparent handling of categorical variables (see Muthén, 2004 for an overview).¹⁷

To identify our model, the scales of the two latent variables (religiosity and radical rightist attitudes) had to be fixed. We did this by setting their respective means to zero and their variances to one. Since we expect the basic structure outlined in our model to apply in all countries but the actual strength of the relationships to vary across systems, we estimated our models on a per-country basis with no equality constraints. Most parameters presented in the tables of the next section are unstandardized regression coefficients. Exceptions are the effects on the dichotomous variables (identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party, considering oneself as belonging to Christianity, and radical right vote), which are represented by unstandardized probit coefficients. While all the relationships depicted in Figure 1 were estimated simultaneously, we will discuss our findings from each regression in turn, so as to make interpretation easier.

Religiosity and extreme right voting: findings and discussion

Starting off with the overall fit between our model and our data, as measured by the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), we can see from Table 1 that this comes very close to the value of 0.05 in most cases, which is conventionally considered to be an indicator for a ‘very good’ fit. In all eight countries, the RMSEA is well below 0.1 which is widely seen as the borderline for an ‘acceptable’ fit.¹⁸

¹⁶ For each country, we created five imputations that were analysed in turn. Since MICE, like other models used for multiple imputation, is a stochastic procedure (see Schafer, 1997; Little and Rubin, 2002 for reviews), these datasets differ slightly from each other, thereby reflecting the amount of uncertainty about the imputed values. Results from the separate analyses of these datasets were combined according to the rules stated by Rubin (1987), resulting in approximately unbiased parameter estimates and conservative standard errors that take the amount of missing data into account. The tables in the next section refer to these combined results only.

¹⁷ While it is common practice in applied Structural Equation Modelling to treat all variables as if they were truly continuous, this is hardly defensible in the case of dichotomies where all the usual caveats against the use of linear dummy regression (nonsensical predicted values, heteroscedastic error variances etc.) apply. The calculation of biserial and tetrachoric correlation coefficients that is sometimes offered as a solution to this problem (e.g. Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993, p. 45) is not appropriate in the case of voting since an underlying normal distribution is assumed.

¹⁸ Amongst the many measures for the overall fit of structural equation models, the RMSEA is rather popular because it corrects for the size of the sample and it has a known distribution.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Turning to our two latent variables, ‘religiosity’ and ‘radical right attitudes’, we can say that they are measured adequately. The two tables (A1 and A2) illustrating this have been placed in the appendix for ease of reading, but they show that, some slight variation notwithstanding, the observed variables (four in the case of ‘religiosity’ and 21 in the case of ‘radical right attitudes’) are measuring the same concept across different countries. All coefficients are significant and positive.¹⁹ What is more, all are, by and large, within the same range. Their substantive interpretation is simple: they reflect the impact of unit (one standard deviation) change of the latent variables on the 7- or 10-point rating scales of the indicators.²⁰

While it is necessary to establish that both latent variables are measured adequately, the substantial relationships are of course more interesting. Table 2 shows the regression of religiosity on the socio-demographics and thereby enables us to see which of the different groups in the eight societies are, on average, more (or less) religious. The findings are interesting because they again point to a largely uniform pattern across the countries. They show that, holding other socio-demographic variables constant, in all countries, men are less religious than women²¹ and older citizens are more religious than younger people.²² Importantly, since the age-groups 30-65 and 66+ have large positive coefficients, the table also indicates that young men – who make up the social group that shows a disproportionately high level of support for the radical right in all West European countries – are also the group least likely to be religious. By contrast to gender and age, education (with the exception of Switzerland and Italy) and class have no significant effects once the other variables are controlled for.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Having examined the relationship between religiosity and socio-demographic attributes, we now turn our attention to the link between radical right-wing attitudes on the one hand, and socio-economic characteristics and religiosity on the other. It is well known from previous research that a) radical right-wing attitudes are an excellent predictor of the radical right vote, and b) that these attitudes are not evenly distributed within society. Higher levels of education are usually associated with more liberal views (Weakliem, 2002; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003) and, as can be seen from Table 3, we too find that education has a distinct effect on radical-right attitudes in all eight societies under study even when the other socio-demographic variables and religiosity are held constant. On average, each one-point increase on the seven-point scale of educational attainment results in a 0.26 point decrease in radical right-wing attitudes. Given the range of the educational scale and the fact that the latent attitudes scale is standardized to have unit variance, this effect is very strong. Moreover, the strength of the effect hardly varies across countries.

¹⁹ Throughout this paper, we use the conventional 5 per cent-threshold.

²⁰ For the identification with a Christian church, the coefficients refer to the change of the probit for registering such an identification.

²¹ The average level of religiosity is 0.4 points lower for men than for women. Given that the scale is standardized to have a variance of 1 (and a mean of zero), this is a considerable difference.

²² This might be either a life-cycle effect or a generational pattern.

As regards class, it too has the expected significant positive effect on radical-right attitudes. Working-class voters and voters categorized as belonging to the petty bourgeoisie show a greater propensity of holding radical right-wing attitudes than other class groups even after controlling for education. The only exception here is the Netherlands, where the effect of class is still positive but somewhat weaker and not statistically significant. The effect of age on radical right-wing attitudes is mostly positive, i.e. older people have – again, on average, and after controlling for the other factors – slightly more radical right-wing attitudes than their younger compatriots. The two exceptions here are Italy, where age effects are reversed, and the Netherlands, where they are insignificant. By contrast, gender has no discernible effect on radical right-wing attitudes, with the exception of Norway, where men have somewhat more radical right-wing attitudes than women.

Finally, with respect to religiosity, we find that this variable has hardly any effect at all on people's attitudes towards radical right issues. In five of the eight countries, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero, and in the three remaining societies, the effect is very weak: an increase or decrease of one standard deviation on our scale of religiosity would result in a change of less than 0.08 standard deviations on our scale of radical right attitudes in Denmark, France, and Norway. From this, we can conclude that both hypotheses H2a and H2b are falsified: *in the eight West European societies under study, religious people are neither more tolerant nor more ethnocentric than their agnostic compatriots once the background variables are controlled for.*

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

From Table 3 alone, one might be tempted to conclude that religiosity has no political consequences in Western Europe's secularised societies. However, Table 4, which shows the probit regression of Christian Democratic / conservative party identification on religiosity as well as on the set of socio-demographic variables, indicates that this assertion would be incorrect: religiosity continues to have a huge impact on one's likelihood of identifying with a Christian Democratic or conservative party. The coefficients are substantial and significant in all countries, although it is interesting to note that the effect is unusually strong in the Netherlands and rather weak in Italy. Of course, with reference to our hypotheses, the strong impact of religiosity on party identification is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the validity of Hypothesis H1, which suggested that religious people are less likely to vote for the radical right because they are firmly attached to Christian Democratic or conservative parties.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Table 4 also shows that men are more likely to identify with a Christian Democratic or conservative party than women – coefficients are positive and significant in all countries but Denmark. That said, it must be borne in mind that men are less religious in all countries. Therefore, the direct positive effect of gender on party identification will often be effectively neutralised (in Belgium, France, and Norway) or even outweighed (in Denmark) by a negative indirect effect of gender via religiosity. The effect of class is negative throughout Western Europe, but is only significant in the two Scandinavian countries, where it most likely reflects

the strength of the labour/capital cleavage.²³ As for education, its effect is significantly positive in Austria, France, and Norway, but insignificant in all other countries. Finally, the effect of age is significant only in France, where it is huge. Again, this is after controlling for religiosity, which is already positively related to age, meaning that the direct and indirect effects of age will reinforce each other.

Table 5 reports the (biserial) correlation between identification with a Christian Democratic / conservative party and radical right-wing attitudes, as represented by the double-headed arrow in Figure 2. Although the coefficients are significant (and positive) in Austria, Denmark, and France, their impact is negligible since correlations in the range of 0.2 or less are equivalent to less than 4 per cent shared variance. Substantively, this means that those people who habitually support a Christian Democratic or conservative party are on average neither more nor less ethnocentric than other voters.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Finally, Table 6 shows the probit regression of a vote for a party of the radical right on radical right-wing attitudes, religiosity, party identification, and the standard set of socio-demographic variables. Here, a first somewhat surprising finding is that the well-known effects of gender, age, class, and education are *not* significantly different from zero in most countries. The obvious explanation for this finding is that the strong effects of these socio-demographic attributes often found in studies of the radical right vote basically reflect the group differences in the strength of right wing attitudes that can be discerned from Table 3. That is, while education, for example, has a massive impact on attitudes, which in turn substantially affects the vote, the correlation between education and the vote disappears once attitudes are controlled for.

Table 6 also shows that radical right-wing attitudes are a powerful predictor of the radical right vote, thus confirming once again that support for these parties should not be interpreted as a non-ideological, protest vote. Rather this support is intimately linked to a perception that immigrants pose a threat and to a willingness to discriminate against them (van der Brug et al., 2000; van der Brug and Fennema, 2003). The coefficients of radical right-wing attitudes are significant, large, and within the same range in seven of the eight countries. The only exception here is Italy, where the effect is rather weak and insignificant. This can be explained in part by the fact that the vast majority of Italian radical right-wing voters are Alleanza Nazionale voters, and that this 'post-fascist' party has moderated its profile in recent years and is not longer considered a part of the radical right by some scholars. Furthermore, even the AN's predecessor party, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), displayed limited hostility to foreigners in its ideology (Newell, 2000; Carter, 2005).²⁴

The direct effect of religiosity on the probability of voting for a party of the radical right is less uniform across the countries under study. In Italy, religiosity has a borderline significant

²³ For this specific relationship, it would obviously make sense to estimate separate effects for members of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie. However, since the number of respondents from the latter class is very small and it is sensible to treat the working class and the petty bourgeoisie as a single group in other respects, we did not do so.

²⁴ Since the number of Fiamma Tricolore and Lega Nord voters is very small (13), it is not possible to discriminate between the supporters of the different Italian radical right parties.

negative impact, while in Switzerland and France being religious clearly raises the probability of casting a vote for a party of the radical right. While there is no obvious explanation for this in the case of the SVP, the findings for France are in line with the FN's appeals to a small but distinct fundamentalist Catholic constituency. In the five other countries, religiosity has no significant effect on the likelihood of voting for a radical right party – a finding that lends support to Hypothesis H3.

Finally, Table 6 indicates that the effects of identifying with a Christian Democratic or conservative party on the likelihood of voting for a party of the radical right are negative and often very large, although they are not significant in four of the eight countries under observation.²⁵ Combined with the results shown in Table 4, this provides further evidence for the validity of Hypothesis H1: *in many cases, religious people are less likely to vote for the radical right because they are firmly attached to Christian Democratic or conservative parties.*

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

From our model we can conclude that religiosity does indeed play a significant role in explaining the radical right vote in Western Europe but that the picture is somewhat more complex than the (early) psychological research would suggest. In a bid to disentangle the various mechanisms, Table 7 illustrates the direct, indirect and total effects of religiosity on the likelihood of casting a vote for a party of the radical right in all eight countries under study. The first row of the table shows that the effect of religiosity via party identification is (often strongly) negative in all countries and significantly so in four of eight.²⁶ By contrast, the second row illustrates that the effect of religiosity via radical right-wing attitudes is mostly weak and insignificant. The sum of these indirect effects (reported in the third row) is negative in all countries and significantly so in five of them.²⁷ The direct effect of religiosity on the likelihood of casting a vote for a party of the radical right is reported in the fourth row of the table, which repeats the information from Table 6 above. Religiosity does not have a uniform effect on the likelihood of a radical right vote across the countries: in five of the eight societies it has no significant effect on the likelihood of voting for a radical right party, whereas in France and Switzerland it raises the probability of a vote for a party of the radical right, and in Italy it lowers this probability. These findings clearly highlight the importance of national contexts, and underline just how much religiosity, and indeed what it means to be religious, is shaped by distinct national influences. The final row of Table 7 reports the total effect of religiosity (indirect and direct). This is negative in all countries except France and Switzerland (where it is essentially zero in both cases).²⁸

²⁵ In the cases of Belgium and especially Austria, the standard errors are somewhat higher than in other countries. This is probably due to the inevitable high level of collinearity caused by the structure of the model, which makes it difficult to obtain an exact estimate of the effects. However, had we applied a one-tailed test (which would be justified because the hypothesis is directional), the Austrian coefficient would be clearly significant, too, and Belgium would constitute another borderline case with $p=0.055$. Nonetheless, for simplicity's sake we apply two-tailed tests throughout this paper.

²⁶ With $p=0.065$, Austria is a borderline case. Again, had we applied a one-tailed test, the coefficient would be significant. On the other hand, there is clearly no indirect effect via party identification in Denmark and Italy.

²⁷ Again, Austria constitutes a borderline case ($p=0.066$).

²⁸ The coefficients are significantly different from zero in five of the eight countries and borderline- insignificant in Austria.

[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

Conclusion

The question that this article set out to investigate was whether religiosity has an effect on the likelihood of casting a vote for a party of the radical right in Western Europe. Our interest in this issue was guided on the one hand by existing bodies of literature that led us to believe that a link between religious involvement and radical right voting might well exist and, on the other, by the fact that very few comparative studies have examined the subject. In an attempt to answer our question, we specified four separate hypotheses regarding the relationship between religiosity and voting for a radical right party. These enabled us to untangle the different effects that religiosity has on the radical right vote. In the first instance we suggested that religiosity might prevent people from voting for the radical right because religious people tend to develop an identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party, and are thus simply not available to the parties of the radical right (Hypothesis H1). We also proposed that religiosity might have an effect on the support for the parties of the radical right via ethnocentric attitudes, and that this effect could either be negative (Hypothesis H2a) or positive (Hypothesis H2b). Lastly, we suggested that once attitudes and socio-demographic attributes are controlled for, there would be no substantial relationship between religiosity and the vote for a party of the radical right (Hypothesis H3).

Somewhat surprisingly, this last hypothesis is not born out in practice in three of the eight countries, where there are significant direct effects of religiosity. There is no obvious explanation for the moderate negative direct effect of religiosity on the likelihood of a radical right vote in Italy, or its clearly stronger positive effect in Switzerland. By contrast, however, the positive effect of religiosity on the likelihood of a vote for the radical right in France is more easily accounted for. Not only has the Front National always taken a tough stand on issues such as abortion, homosexuality and the role of the church, but the party also has links with ultra-Catholic groups opposed to the church's alleged 'liberalism' (Veugelers, 2000; Minkenberg, 2003, p. 211). While studies of the Front National's electorate demonstrate that most of its voters are overwhelmingly attracted by the party's ethnocentrism and do not care about issues related to the church and its traditional teachings, and while the official church has become a leading critic of the FN's anti-minority policies (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992; Veugelers, 2000), it is quite possible that these elements of the party's appeal are attractive to a small segment of Catholic fundamentalists.

It also turns out that neither Hypothesis H2a nor Hypothesis H2b is born out in practice. In other words, we found no evidence to support the idea that religious people are less likely to vote for the radical right because they are more altruistic, tolerant and compassionate and hence are less likely to espouse ethnocentric attitudes; and nor did we find evidence to support the contrary suggestion (which is rooted in a long-standing body of literature) that such people are more likely to vote for these parties because their religiosity is linked with higher levels of prejudice. While the second link in this causal chain (that ethnocentric attitudes are very strong predictors of radical right voting) is confirmed in our findings (except in Italy, where, it has been argued, the AN is substantially different from other parties of the radical right), the first link is not: we found no relation between religiosity and ethnocentric attitudes. All the effects were either statistically insignificant or irrelevant in substantial terms.

Of course, whether the absence of an overall relationship between religiosity and ethnocentrism is due to different mechanisms that counter-balance each other or to a true non-relationship cannot be ascertained with the data at hand. Yet, if we accept the absence of a link between religiosity and ethnocentric attitudes at face value, this is clearly at odds with the findings of the earlier literature, and thus raises interesting questions. Setting aside concerns over the conceptual and methodological rigour of the early studies, one possible explanation for this contradiction would be that religiosity and ethnocentrism may well have been linked when these previous analyses were carried out (mainly in the 1950s and 1960s), but that this relationship has since waned and disappeared. Indeed, religious teachings, and hence religious values and convictions are unlikely to have remained unaffected by social change, secularization and globalization, and it is thus very likely that belief systems are today less 'closed' than they used to be, or that religious outlooks are less 'particularistic'. Yet the problem with this line of reasoning is that, everything else being equal, we would expect to have seen greater support for parties of the radical right in the 1950s and 1960s as compared to today. And this is clearly not the case: the radical right has been electorally more successful in the last two decades than at any point since World War Two.

Perhaps then the explanation is not temporal but geographical. Indeed, the vast majority of the studies that pointed to a link between religiosity and ethnocentrism were carried out in the US, many of them on college students, and it may well simply be that, while there was a relationship between religiosity and ethnocentrism among these respondents, that same relationship does not exist within West European electorates. This of course, once again, points to the importance of national contexts, both in terms of what religion means and entails in different societies and in terms of its manifestation and representation in the political system.

Clearly we can only speculate on the reasons why we found no link between religiosity and ethnocentric attitudes, and indeed, as we noted above, it could be that there are different relationships between religiosity and ethnocentrism that actually counter-balance each other. From our more narrow perspective, however, regardless of this relationship, we can confidently conclude that in the societies under observation, religiosity does not affect the vote for the radical right because of any influence religiosity might have on ethnocentric attitudes.

Attitudes, however, remain crucial. Indeed, while the first link in our suggested causal chain (that religious people are either more or less ethnocentric) was falsified by our findings, the second was not. Like others (van der Brug et al., 2000; van der Brug and Fennema, 2003), we found that ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes are very strong predictors of radical right voting. Our analyses thus provide further evidence that voters who vote for parties of the radical right are doing so because they agree with the policies of these parties, and in particular with their discriminatory and xenophobic appeals.

In contrast to H3, H2a and H2b, Hypothesis H1 is borne out in practice: in all countries religiosity has a substantial and statistically positive effect on the likelihood of a voter identifying with a Christian Democratic or conservative party. This in turn massively reduces the likelihood of casting a vote for a party of the radical right in many countries. We therefore conclude that 'good Christians' are neither especially tolerant towards ethnic minorities nor attracted by the radical right's ethnocentric and sometimes authoritarian rhetoric. Rather, to a large degree, they are simply still attached to Christian Democratic or conservative parties,

and although they do not necessary vote for these parties, this attachment ‘vaccinates’ them against voting for a party of the radical right.²⁹

This points to the continued importance of religiosity as a predictor of electoral choice. Yet, this ‘vaccine effect’ is likely to become weaker with time due to general de-alignment trends induced by social modernization and value change. Just as the parties of the mainstream left can no longer count on a traditional base of working class voters, Christian Democratic and conservative parties are today faced with fewer religious voters than they once were. Thus, in spite of still being able to ‘encapsulate’ religious voters, this natural reservoir of support is shrinking. All other things being equal, therefore, this points to an increase in the *potential* of radical right parties.

²⁹ This idea of ‘vaccination’ or ‘immunisation’, which prevents a vote for the ‘wrong’ party, is outlined by Scarbrough (1984, p. 190).

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Tables

Table 1: Overall model fit

	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
RMSEA	0.069	0.063	0.056	0.051	0.055	0.066	0.059	0.061

Note:

RMSEA: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation

Table 2: Determinants of religiosity

Religiosity on...	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
Gender	-0.28* (0.06)	-0.38* (0.06)	-0.30* (0.06)	-0.51* (0.07)	-0.37* (0.07)	-0.55* (0.07)	-0.23* (0.05)	-0.46* (0.06)
Education	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)
Class	0.03 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.04 (0.06)	0.07 (0.09)
Age 30-65	0.58* (0.09)	0.43* (0.09)	0.66* (0.12)	0.52* (0.10)	0.33* (0.09)	0.32* (0.10)	0.21* (0.09)	0.37* (0.08)
Age over 65	0.79* (0.11)	1.31* (0.11)	1.00* (0.13)	0.98* (0.12)	1.08* (0.11)	0.67* (0.12)	0.65* (0.11)	0.90* (0.09)

Notes:

Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in brackets

Variables:

Religiosity: latent variable constructed from four observed variables (see Table A1).

Gender: men coded 1, women coded 0.

Education: 7-point scale, running from 1 'no primary education' to 7 'second stage of tertiary education'

Class: Workers, farmers and petty bourgeoisie coded 1, all other classes coded 0.

Age: 18-29, 30-65, over 65. Reference category is 18-29.

Table 3: Determinants of radical right attitudes

Radical right attitudes on...	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
Religiosity	0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Gender	0.05 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.16* (0.05)
Education	-0.30* (0.02)	-0.20* (0.02)	-0.21* (0.03)	-0.34* (0.04)	-0.23* (0.02)	-0.23* (0.04)	-0.26* (0.02)	-0.33* (0.03)
Class	0.27* (0.07)	0.25* (0.06)	0.26* (0.07)	0.15* (0.07)	0.17* (0.08)	0.31* (0.10)	0.10 (0.06)	0.15* (0.06)
Age 30-65	0.26* (0.08)	0.19* (0.08)	0.03 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09)	0.25* (0.09)	-0.23* (0.10)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.04 (0.07)
Age over 65	0.60* (0.11)	0.30* (0.10)	0.30* (0.11)	0.56* (0.11)	0.34* (0.11)	-0.32* (0.13)	0.19 (0.10)	0.43* (0.09)

Notes:

Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in brackets

Variables:

Radical right attitudes: latent variable constructed from 21 observed variables (see Table A2)

Other variables: as Table 2.

Table 4: Determinants of Christian Democratic / conservative party identification

CD PID on...	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
Religiosity	0.53* (0.05)	0.66* (0.07)	0.61* (0.09)	0.38* (0.06)	0.36* (0.06)	0.27* (0.07)	1.01* (0.07)	0.48* (0.04)
Gender	0.28* (0.09)	0.30* (0.10)	0.46* (0.14)	0.14 (0.13)	0.21* (0.10)	0.28* (0.14)	0.39* (0.09)	0.29* (0.08)
Education	0.10* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.10 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.09* (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	0.16* (0.04)
Class	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.23 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.47* (0.14)	0.14 (0.12)	-0.28 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.25* (0.13)
Age 30-65	0.19 (0.14)	0.11 (0.16)	-0.36 (0.22)	0.06 (0.21)	0.53* (0.16)	0.18 (0.17)	0.07 (0.14)	0.02 (0.11)
Age over 65	0.15 (0.17)	0.33 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.23)	0.29 (0.23)	0.80* (0.19)	0.07 (0.23)	0.14 (0.16)	-0.01 (0.14)

Notes:

Entries are unstandardized probit coefficients; standard errors are in brackets

CD PID: party identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party (1: yes; 0: no)

Other variables: as Table 2.

Table 5: Correlation of Christian Democratic / conservative party identification and radical right attitudes

Correlation with...	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
Rad right att	0.13* (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)	0.19* (0.05)	0.13 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)

Notes:

Entries are correlations (Pearson); standard errors in brackets.

Rad right att: Radical right attitudes (see also Table A2)

Table 6: Determinants of radical right voting

Radical right voting on...	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
Rad right att	0.72* (0.24)	0.59* (0.08)	0.50* (0.10)	0.60* (0.07)	0.65* (0.15)	0.19 (0.11)	0.62* (0.07)	0.59* (0.07)
Religiosity	0.28 (0.24)	0.03 (0.18)	0.42* (0.19)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.31* (0.13)	-0.20* (0.10)	0.27 (0.14)	0.06 (0.07)
Gender	0.52 (0.30)	0.33 (0.18)	0.55* (0.22)	0.24 (0.14)	0.50* (0.21)	-0.11 (0.29)	0.23 (0.13)	0.39* (0.12)
Education	0.19 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.25)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.06)
Class	0.00 (0.25)	0.03 (0.17)	0.17 (0.15)	0.01 (0.16)	0.35 (0.27)	0.19 (0.55)	-0.14 (0.13)	0.18 (0.15)
Age 30-65	-0.26 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.32)	-0.22 (0.17)	0.72 (0.39)	0.15 (0.46)	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.30* (0.15)
Age over 65	-0.15 (0.34)	-0.45 (0.31)	0.07 (0.34)	-0.17 (0.22)	0.35 (0.40)	0.47 (0.55)	-0.28 (0.19)	-0.52* (0.19)
CD PID	-0.92 (0.49)	-0.40 (0.25)	-0.69* (0.22)	-0.17 (0.13)	-0.83* (0.22)	-0.26 (0.28)	-0.50* (0.12)	-0.61* (0.12)

Notes:

Entries are unstandardized probit coefficients; standard errors are in brackets

Variables:

Radical right voting: dummy variable (1: yes; 0: no)

Rad right att: Radical right attitudes (see Table A2)

Other variables: see Tables 2 –4.

Table 7: Decomposition of the effect of religiosity

Religiosity on radical right voting	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
Via CD PID	-0.48 (0.26)	-0.26 (0.17)	-0.41* (0.16)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.30* (0.09)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.51* (0.13)	-0.29* (0.07)
Via Rad right att	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Total indirect	-0.46 (0.25)	-0.27 (0.17)	-0.40* (0.16)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.26* (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.53* (0.13)	-0.26* (0.07)
Direct	0.28 (0.24)	0.03 (0.18)	0.42* (0.19)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.31* (0.13)	-0.20* (0.10)	0.27 (0.14)	0.06 (0.08)
Total	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.25* (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.21* (0.08)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.26* (0.09)	-0.26* (0.06)	-0.19* (0.05)

Notes:

Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in brackets

Radical right voting: dummy variable

CD PID: party identification with a Christian Democratic or conservative party (1: yes; 0: no)

Rad right att: Radical right attitudes (see also Table A2)

Appendix

Table A1: Measurement of religiosity

Religiosity by...	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
Praying	1.61* (0.10)	1.50* (0.09)	1.65* (0.12)	1.37* (0.09)	1.42* (0.09)	1.60* (0.14)	2.06* (0.16)	1.60* (0.08)
Attendance	1.22* (0.05)	0.94* (0.04)	1.05* (0.04)	0.65* (0.03)	0.92* (0.04)	1.04* (0.06)	1.16* (0.05)	0.81* (0.03)
Belonging	1.80* (0.16)	1.83* (0.16)	1.10* (0.08)	0.78* (0.06)	1.78* (0.20)	1.05* (0.08)	2.87* (0.42)	0.67* (0.04)
Self-stated religiosity	1.70* (0.07)	2.14* (0.09)	1.67* (0.08)	1.86* (0.08)	2.18* (0.11)	2.06* (0.07)	1.97* (0.09)	1.84* (0.07)

Notes:

Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in brackets. Scales for praying and attendance were reversed to facilitate interpretation

Variables:

Praying: Private religious practice / praying (Question reads: Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray? Scale runs from 1 'Every day' to 7 'Never').

Attendance: Attending services (Question reads: Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays? Scale runs from 1 'Every day' to 7 'Never').

Belonging: Belonging to a Christian church / considering oneself to be a Christian (1: yes; 0: no)

Self-stated religiosity: Question reads: Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? Scale runs from 0 'Not at all religious' to 10 'Very religious'.

Table A2: Measurement of radical right-wing attitudes

Radical right attitudes by...	Austria	Belgium	Switz.	Denmark	France	Italy	Neths.	Norway
Wage	0.42* (0.03)	0.47* (0.03)	0.34* (0.03)	0.27* (0.03)	0.52* (0.04)	0.53* (0.04)	0.37* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)
Ec prospect of poor	0.50* (0.03)	0.50* (0.03)	0.46* (0.03)	0.39* (0.03)	0.62* (0.04)	0.61* (0.04)	0.37* (0.02)	0.36* (0.02)
Take jobs	1.01* (0.04)	1.07* (0.04)	0.74* (0.04)	0.82* (0.04)	1.24* (0.06)	0.62* (0.08)	0.65* (0.03)	0.73* (0.04)
Put in/take out	1.46* (0.05)	1.07* (0.05)	1.02* (0.05)	1.10* (0.06)	1.38* (0.06)	0.93* (0.07)	1.03* (0.04)	1.02* (0.05)
+/- for ec	1.39* (0.05)	1.37* (0.05)	1.17* (0.05)	1.59* (0.06)	1.67* (0.06)	1.29* (0.07)	1.24* (0.04)	1.21* (0.04)
+/- for culture	1.55* (0.05)	1.24* (0.05)	1.45* (0.06)	1.55* (0.06)	1.86* (0.07)	1.13* (0.08)	1.23* (0.04)	1.35* (0.05)
+/- place to live	1.37* (0.04)	1.32* (0.04)	0.99* (0.03)	1.48* (0.05)	1.66* (0.05)	1.06* (0.07)	1.17* (0.04)	1.18* (0.04)
Crime +/-	1.08* (0.04)	1.12* (0.05)	0.92* (0.04)	1.14* (0.05)	1.17* (0.06)	0.71* (0.07)	1.01* (0.04)	0.81* (0.03)
Unemp leave	0.69* (0.03)	0.68* (0.03)	0.56* (0.03)	0.55* (0.03)	0.93* (0.05)	0.58* (0.04)	0.64* (0.03)	0.56* (0.03)
Im rights	0.52* (0.03)	0.47* (0.03)	0.48* (0.03)	0.38* (0.02)	0.66* (0.04)	0.38* (0.03)	0.37* (0.02)	0.27* (0.02)
Serious crime leave	0.50* (0.03)	0.46* (0.03)	0.38* (0.02)	0.38* (0.03)	0.74* (0.04)	0.33* (0.03)	0.50* (0.03)	0.45* (0.02)
Any crime leave	0.74* (0.04)	0.58* (0.03)	0.59* (0.04)	0.39* (0.03)	0.83* (0.05)	0.50* (0.04)	0.58* (0.03)	0.50* (0.03)
Im white	0.82* (0.07)	0.77* (0.07)	0.83* (0.06)	0.81* (0.07)	1.13* (0.08)	0.90* (0.10)	0.68* (0.05)	1.09* (0.06)
Im boss	1.03* (0.07)	1.68* (0.10)	1.28* (0.08)	1.27* (0.10)	1.64* (0.11)	1.14* (0.12)	1.33* (0.07)	1.38* (0.07)
Im marry relative	1.04* (0.07)	1.69* (0.11)	1.24* (0.09)	1.54* (0.13)	1.91* (0.13)	1.11* (0.12)	1.42* (0.08)	1.56* (0.09)
Fair share ref	-0.61* (0.03)	-0.61* (0.03)	-0.54* (0.03)	-0.49* (0.03)	-0.59* (0.03)	-0.32* (0.03)	-0.59* (0.02)	-0.46* (0.02)
Work during applic	0.42* (0.03)	0.37* (0.03)	0.34* (0.03)	0.34* (0.03)	0.60* (0.04)	0.30* (0.03)	0.21* (0.02)	0.29* (0.02)
Generous ref status	0.65* (0.03)	0.51* (0.03)	0.58* (0.03)	0.47* (0.03)	0.53* (0.04)	0.43* (0.03)	0.39* (0.02)	0.42* (0.02)
Persecution	-0.52* (0.03)	-0.40* (0.03)	-0.39* (0.03)	-0.56* (0.03)	-0.36* (0.03)	-0.19* (0.03)	-0.41* (0.02)	-0.39* (0.02)
Detention	-0.48* (0.03)	-0.57* (0.03)	-0.54* (0.04)	-0.44* (0.03)	-0.62* (0.04)	-0.29* (0.04)	-0.49* (0.03)	-0.36* (0.02)
Fin support	0.51* (0.03)	0.40* (0.03)	0.43* (0.03)	0.25* (0.02)	0.62* (0.04)	0.39* (0.03)	0.43* (0.03)	0.39* (0.02)
Bring family	0.53* (0.03)	0.59* (0.03)	0.60* (0.04)	0.53* (0.04)	0.68* (0.04)	0.47* (0.03)	0.55* (0.03)	0.47* (0.03)

Notes:

Entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in brackets. Where necessary, scales were reversed so that high values refer to the anti-immigrant position.

Variables:

Wage: Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to live and work here. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Ec prospect of poor: People who come to live and work here generally harm the economic prospects of the poor more than the rich. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Take jobs: Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs? Scale runs from 0 'Take jobs away' to 10 'Create new jobs'.

Put in/take out: Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out? Scale runs from 0 'Generally take out more' to 10 'Generally put in more'.

+/- for ec: Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? Scale runs from 0 'Bad for the economy' to 10 'Good for the economy'.

+/- for culture: And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Scale runs from 0 'Cultural life is undermined' to 10 'Cultural life is enriched'.

+/- place to live: Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? Scale runs from 0 'Worse place to live' to 10 'Better place to live'

Crime +/-: Are [country]'s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries? Scale runs from 0 'Crime problems made worse' to 10 'Crime problems made better'.

Unemp leave: If people who have come to live and work here are unemployed for a long period, they should be made to leave. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Im rights: People who have come to live here should be given the same rights as everyone else. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Serious crime leave: If people who have come to live here commit a serious crime, they should be made to leave. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Any crime leave: If people who have come to live here commit any crime, they should be made to leave. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Im white: Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here: be white. Scale runs from 0 'Extremely unimportant' to 10 'Extremely important'.

Im boss: Now thinking again of people who have come to live in [country] from another country who are of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people, how much would you mind or not mind if someone like this was appointed as your boss? Scale runs from 0 'Not mind at all' to 10 'Mind a lot'.

Im marry relative: Now thinking again of people who have come to live in [country] from another country who are of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people, how much would you mind or not mind if someone like this married a close relative of yours? Scale runs from 0 'Not mind at all' to 10 'Mind a lot'.

Fair share ref: [Country] has more than its fair share of people applying for refugee status. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Work during applic: While their applications for refugee status are being considered, people should be allowed to work in [country]. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Generous ref status: The government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Persecution: Most applicants for refugee status aren't in real fear of persecution in their own countries. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Detention: While their cases are being considered, applicants should be kept in detention centres. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Fin support: While their cases are being considered, the [country] government should give financial support to applicants. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.

Bring family: Refugees whose applications are granted should be entitled to bring in their close family members. Scale runs from 1 'Agree strongly' to 5 'Disagree strongly'.





Figure 1: The Building Blocks of the Causal Model



Notes:

1. Squares represent observed variables, ovals represent latent constructs
2. 'Socio-Demographics' refers to class (a dummy for workers and petty bourgeoisie), age (dummies for being under 30 or over 65), gender, and level of formal education. The respective effects of these four variables are estimated separately.
3. Arrows for the residuals are not shown for lack of space.

Figure 2: The Causal Model